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COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR
COMPUTER SOFTWARE IN ISRAEL
by BARRY LEVENFELD*
I.

INTRODUCTION**

When, in 1924, King George V accepted the advice of his Privy
Council and issued an order extending England's Copyright Act of 1911
(hereinafter the "1911 Act") to Palestine, he could not have had computer programs in mind.' And presumably the Right Honorable Sir
Herbert Louis Samuel, the High Commissioner for Palestine, was not
thinking of ROM chips or object code 2 when he proclaimed that the
1911 Act "shall come into operation and have effect in Palestine as of
the 21st day of March, 1924." 3 However, since that day, with only minor
*

Member of the Bars of Israel and New York. The author, an attorney in private

practice in Israel, serves on the Legal Advisory Committee of the Israel Association of
Software Houses. He gratefully acknowledges the assistance rendered by other members
of the Committee in the preparation of this article, particularly that of advocate Naomi
Assia.
** A note on citations to Israeli law: "P.D." refers to Piskei Din, law reports of the
Supreme Court, published in hebrew by the Ministry of Justice; "P.M." refers to Psakim
Mehoziim, law reports of the District Courts, published in Hebrew by the Israel Bar
Association; "P.D.A." refers to Piskei Din Avoda, law reports of the Labor Courts,
published in Hebrew by the Israel Bar Association; "L.S.I." refers to Laws of the State of
Israel, the authorized English translation of the session laws of the Knesset published by
the Ministry of Justice; "L.P." refers to Laws of Palestine, a 1933 English language
compilation of British Mandatory laws; "K.T." refers to Kovetz Takanot, a Hebrew
compilation of regulations and other subsidiary legislation.
1. Order-in-Council, Copyright Act, 1911 (Extension to Palestine) Order, 1924, 1 L.P.
29, The Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, ch. 46 (hereinafter "the 1911 Act").
2. "ROM (Read Only Memory) chips" are a means of permanently storing a program in a computer's memory on a semiconductor chip. ROM chips are sometimes referred to as "firmware" because they occupy the middle ground between "software" and
"hardware." "Object code" is a machine-readable version of a program's "source code,"
generated by "compiling" the source code with the assistance of a computer. While source
code resembles a written human language and can be understood by a properly trained
computer expert, "object cede" cannot be deciphered without the assistance of a computer
by means of a process called "decompiling." See also 1 BENDER, COMPUTER LAw §§ 2.06 &
3.02 (1986) (for a useful explanation of computer technology relating to software).
3. Proclamation, Copyright Act, 1911 (Extension to Palestine) Order, 1924, 2 L.P.
412.
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amendments, 4 the 1911 Act has continued to provide the exclusive legal
basis for copyright protection in the former British dominion that today
constitutes the independent State of Israel.
Israel, like most Western countries, is faced with the challenge of
adapting time-honored and somewhat archaic legal categories to the
fast-changing realities of modern science, including computer technology. In response to that challenge, England replaced its 1911 Act with
the Copyright Act of 1956 and enacted legislation dealing specifically
with the copyright protection of computer programs.5 The United
States also has revised its copyright laws and directly confronted the issue of granting copyright protection to computer programs. 6 Other
countries have enacted or are considering similar legislation. 7 By contrast, Israel retains copyright legislation dating back to the turn of the
century. The Israeli legislature, the Knesset, has not updated the law.
4. Several months after introduction of the 1911 Act, the Copyright Ordinance of
1924, 1 L.P. 389 (hereinafter the "1924 Ordinance") was enacted to provide for the application of certain portions of the 1911 Act relating primarily to import regulations in Palestine. Subsequently, both the 1911 Act and the 1924 Ordinance have been amended on a
number of occasions. See Copyright Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 5713-1953, No. 17, 7
L.S.I. 30 (inserting provisions dealing with anonymous and foreign works, and making
amendments required by the termination of British control of Palestine; Copyright Ordinance (Amendment No. 2) Law, 5728-1968, No. 27, 22 L.S.I. 56 (inserting provisions permitting the use of copyrighted materials for purposes of instructional broadcasts);
Copyright Ordinance Amendment No. 3) Law, 5731-1971, No. 58, 25 L.S.I. 157 (extending
the term of copyright protection to life plus seventy years); Copyright Ordinance (Amendment No. 4) Law, 5741-1981, No. 109, 35 L.S.I. 368 (adding, inter alia, the concept of droit
moral, or moral rights, to Israel's copyright law).
5. See, e.g., Copyright Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz 2, ch. 74; Copyright (Computer Software)
Amendment Act, 1985, ch. 1, § 1(1) (the statute grants the same protection to computer
programs in the United Kingdom as it grants to literary works).
6. In the United States the 1909 Copyright Law was replaced by the Copyright Act
of 1976, which did not expressly protect computer programs. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)). In July of 1978, the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) issued its Final Report, recommending specific protections for computer software. Congress adopted those recommendations in the Computer Software Amendment Act of 1980, which adds explicit protection
for computer programs and enumerates certain non-infringing uses of computer programs. See generally, SCOTT, COMPUTER LAW §§ 3.1 to 3.11 (1984) (for a more in depth
discussion of copyright legislation in the United States).
7. See, e.g., ProposedCopyright Reform in Sweden" The Swedish Copyright Committee Report, 5 SOFTWARE PROTECTION 13 (Dec. 1986); Racicot, Copyright Reform in Canada
as it Relates to Computer Programs, 4 SOFrwARE PROTECTION 1 (Feb. 1986); Betten, The
Legal Protectionof Computer Software in West Germany, 5 SOFTWARE PROTECTION 1, 3
(July 1986); Sugiyama and Kosins, The Japanese Solution to the Protection of Computer
Programs, 4 SOFrwARE PROTECTION 11, 15 (Sept. 1985); Crisp, The Legal Protection of
Computer Software: Recent Developments in Australia, 1 SOFTwARE L.J. 289 (SpringSummer 1986); Garby, Software ProtectionAgainst Third Parties in France, 1 SOFTwARE
L.J. 333 (Spring-Summer 1986).

1987/]

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Considering the advanced development in Israel of highly technological industry, and of the software industry in particular,8 the lack of
progressive legislation has exasperated businessmen, academics, and
judges. 9 An Israeli judge recently put the problem in perspective while
wrestling with the application of the 1911 Act to the unauthorized reproduction of video cassettes:
I have no doubt that a lot of valuable effort and time would be saved if
the legislature would update the 1911 Act in a timely manner and
would avoid having this court embark upon the almost impossible task
of attempting to apply concepts set forth in a law from 1911-when
moving pictures were still in their infancy and television broadcasts
and video recordings had not been dreamt of-a task which almost re0
quires the skill of a juggler.'
Notwithstanding the judge's complaint, the almost impossible task of
applying the 1911 Act to today's technologies continues to confront
judges, lawyers and software companies.
The lack of legislative initiative, however, has not completely stifled copyright protection of computer software. The 1911 Act is very
flexible, and courts can adapt, and have adopted, many of its provisions
to the needs of new technology. The Israeli judiciary has demonstrated
a willingness to interpret the 1911 Act in light of recent technological
developments and has paid careful attention to the decisions of courts in
other jurisdictions which share the common heritage of the British legal
system. Also, certain groups, among them The Israeli Association of
Software Houses, are urging the adoption of legislation dealing specifically with the problems posed by computer programs."
8. Comprised of over 65 independent companies, the Israeli Association of Software
Houses represents the interests of its members and compiles data on the software industry. The Israeli software industry has experienced an annual growth rate of 30% since the
mid-1970's. In addition, computers have been introduced in many schools, and all universities, and the Israeli public is growing increasingly computer literate. ISRAELI ASSOCIATION OF SOFTWARE HOUSES, ISRAELI SOFTWARE PRODUCTS (1987).

9. See Shalgi, Copyright in Software and Data,21 ISRAEL L. REV. 15 (1986) (attached
to the article are excerpts from the panel discussion that followed presentation of his article); see Bar-Sela, Computer Legislation in Israeli: A Proposal Being Developed by the
Ministry of Justice, 21 ISRAEL L. REV. 58 (1986).
10. State of Israel v. Videotext, Crim. Case No. 916/80, 1983 P.M. 45, 60 (Rehovot
Magistrates Ct.).
11. Although lobbying for legislative reform, the Israeli Association of Software
houses has not yet formally proposed an amendment. The Committee for the Revision of
Copyright Law in Israel, meeting under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice, has also
considered the issues raised by computer software. See Shalgi, supra note 9. The Ministry
of Justice has circulated a draft of a "Computer Act" which directly addresses the issue of
software protection in the context of a comprehensive law dealing with criminal and civil
aspects of computer software and hardware. Although such comprehensive legislation
may indeed be desirable, it is the author's opinion that the protection of software should
begin by enacting a minor amendment to the existing copyright laws.
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This Article will review Israeli statutory and case law relevant to
the copyright protection of computer software, comparing Israeli law
with the law of other jurisdictions where appropriate. In particular,
this Article will examine works protected by copyright, the scope of
protection afforded protected works, and copyright ownership. Also included is an outline of a proposed amendment to Israeli copyright law
intended to clarify the extent of protection afforded computer
programs.
II.

WORKS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT

Under Israeli law, copyright "subsists" in every "original literary
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not exhaustive.' 8 In the first case to consider the issue, Apple Computer
Inc. v. New-Corn Technologies,'9 the court held that "literary works" included computer programs. In that case 2° the creators and importers of
Apple computers brought an action against the importer of certain Apple twins, computers with the same appearance and identical function
as the Apple, marketed under the names Apollo, Corn 100 and New
Com.21 The Apple twins functioned like Apple originals because the
twins contained integrated circuits with unauthorized copies of certain
Apple programs known as Apple Soft and Autostart. In addition, the
twins contained unauthorized copies of a printed circuit called a Mother
Board. 22
The court examined the language of the 1911 Act and considered
decisions of courts in England, Canada, the United States and Australia.23 The court concluded that the act should be construed liberally
and its definitions should not be treated as exhaustive. The court decided to expand the definition of "literary act" in order to protect works
which, although suitable and appropriate objects of protection, were not
considered by the legislature at the adoption of the 1911 Act.
In deciding that a computer program deserved protection as a liter24
ary work, the court applied the following reasoning:
A computer program, which is the product of the mind of the man who
creates and writes it, is a literary work according to the definition in
the Act, by virtue of having the characteristics and criteria of a literary
work, and a computer program, whether in source code or object code,
18. See Strosky Ltd. v. Whitman Ice Cream Ltd., Civ. Appeal No. 360/83, 40 [III] P.D.
340, 349 (1985) ("Under our definition, there is no escaping the holding that an architectural plan or series of electronic printed circuits are 'literary works'.") See also, State of
Israel v. Ahimon, Civ. Appeal No. 136/71, 26 [II] P.D. 259, 261 (1972) (dictum stating that
booklet prepared by an accountant containing schedules indicating amount of income tax
and other amounts which employers must deduct from employees' salaries is a "literary
work"); S.B.L. Fiberglass Engineering Ltd. v. Leisher, Civ. Appeal No. 606.76, 31 [III] P.D.
333, 335 (1977) (architectural plans); Kotelidsky v. Elkalai, Civ. File No. 557/79, 1982 [A]
P.M. 387, 392 (Dist. Ct. Tel Aviv-Jaffa) (master layout for printed circuit).
19. Civil File No. 3021/84, 1987 [A] P.M. 397 (Tel aviv-Jaffa Dist. Ct.).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 400.
22. Id.
23. Among other decisions, the Apple v. New-Corn court. relied on the decision of the
Federal Court of Australia in Apple Computer Inc. v. Computer Edge, Pty. Ltd., 53 Aust.
L.R. 225 (1984). That case was subsequently reversed by the High Court under the name
Computer Edge v. Apple Computer,reported in 60 AUSTRALIAN L.J. at 313 (June, 1986), in
a decision which applied the version of Australia's Copyright Act 1968 that was in force
before the 1984 amendment that specifically extended protection to computer programs.
The court also discussed the United Kingdom case of Sega v. Richards, the Canadian Case
of Space File Ltd. v. Smart Computing; and the United States case of Apple v. Franklin.
24. Apple, [A] P.M. at 405 (1987).
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whether written and printed on disks or fixed in ROM, is a literary
work protected by the Act.

The Apple v. New-Com court went on to hold that Apple Soft and
Autostart were protected as literary works under the 1911 Act. 25
Although the Supreme Court of Israel has yet to consider the issue, it is

likely that the Apple v. New-Com holding, which reflects the emerging
international legal consensus, 26 will remain an influential statement of

the law on this issue for some time. 27 To eliminate any residual uncertainty, the Apple v. New-Com holding can and should be codified by an
appropriate amendment to the 1911 Act or to the 1924 Ordinance.
B.

EXCLUSION OF REGISTRABLE DESIGNS

The 1911 Act does not apply to designs "capable of being registered
under the Patents and Designs Act, 1907. ' ' 28 The 1911 Act, however, retains copyright protection for certain registrable designs. Designs which
"are not used or intended to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied by any industrial process," continue to be protected. 29 The question has arisen whether the 1911 Act denies copyright protection to both
25. Id.
26. In addition to the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, other countries,
including possibly Canada, also appear to be joining the consensus. See Space File v.
Smart Computing, 74 C.P.R. (2d) 281 (1981) (Ontario Trial Court); IBM Corp. v. Spirales,
80 C.P.R. (2d) 187 (1984) (Federal Court of Canada-Trial Division); La Societe
d'Informatique R.D.G. Inc. v. Dynabec, 6 C.P.R. (3d) 299 (1985) (Quebec Trial Court), 322
(Quebec Court of Appeal). See also Gordon, Copyrightabilityof Object Code and ROM in
Japan, Australia and Germany: Surpassing Traditional Copyright Limits 6 COMPUTER
L.J. 513 (1986).
27. There have been a number of unreported cases dealing inconclusively with the issue of protection of computer software. The issue of copyright protection for computer
software was briefed in Ahitov v. Harpaz, Civ. File No. 20495/82 (Tel Aviv Dist. Ct.) (unpublished), but the court ruled without addressing the issue of copyright. Similarly, the
question arose in Apple Computer Inc. v. MC.L. Computers, Ltd., Civ. File No. 4662/86
(Tel Aviv Dist. Ct.) (unpublished), but a compromise between the parties prevented adjudication of the issue. In Ashton-Tate Ltd. v. Annani Systems Ltd., Civ. File No. 1130/87
(Tel Aviv Dist. Ct.) (unpublished), Ashton-Tate and its local Israeli distributor obtained a
permanent injunction against an Israeli systems house preventing the importing and selling of programs copied form Ashton Tate's widely used "dBase III Plus." Since the injunction issued as a result of a compromise reached between the parties, there is no
decision on the merits of the case.
28. 1911 Act, § 22(1). Section 2 of the Patents and Design Ordinance, 1925, defines
"design" as "... only the features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornament applied to
any article by any industrial process or means... which in the finished article appeal to,
and are judged solely by, the eye, but does not include any mode or principle of construction or anything which is in substance a mere mechanical device." 2 L.P. 1076.
29. The Design Rules applicable to the Patents and Design Ordinance specifically
provide in Rule 72 that:
A design shall be deemed to be used as a model of pattern to be multiplied by any
industrial process within the meaning of section 22 [of the 1911 Act]:--
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master layouts for printed circuits and to the actual printed circuits
which under certain circumstances contain computer programs.
The case of Kotelidsky v. Elkalai30 presented the Tel Aviv District
Court with the question of whether copyright protection should be applied to a master layout for a printed circuit. The court found that "the
master layout under discussion is a chart or plan as meant by [Section
35(a) of the 1911] Act, and therefore constitutes a 'literary work' according to the definition in the Act."' 31 The court then considered the defendant's argument that section 22 precluded copyright protection for
the master layout. Reasoning that the object on which a design appears
is purchased not because of the attributes of the design per se, but because of the utility of the object itself, the court rejected this argument.
The court noted that a printed circuit board is purchased precisely because of the design, and in fact has no use or function whatsoever
before being imprinted with the design. Accordingly, the master layout
is not a design, and section 22 of the 1911 Act does not preclude copy32
right protection.
In the subsequent case of Apple Computer v. New-Com Technologies,33 Apple Computer, Inc. claimed copyright protection for a printed
circuit called a Mother Board which had been copied without authorization and inserted into the Apple twins. Stating that the Mother Board
may be "a design intended to be multiplied and one which apparently
...was indeed multiplied in many editions," the court denied copyright
protection to the Mother Board. The court offered no discussion or reasoning in support of the position that a printed circuit board is a design,
and seemed to be unaware of the earlier contrary decision in Kotelid(a)

when the design is reproduced or is intended to be reproduced in more

than fifty single articles [unless forming a single set];
(b) where the design is to be applied to(i) printed paper hangings;
(ii) carpets, floor clothes or oil clothes...
(iii)textile piece goods...

(iv)

lace not made by hand 2 L.P. 1910 (adopted January 1, 1925).

It appears that if a particular version of a computer program is deemed a "design," and if
that version is reproduced in fifty or more articles, including, presumably, diskettes, then
that "design" would not qualify for copyright protection.

30. Kotelidsky, 1982 [A] P.M. at 392.
31. Id. But see, Strosky v. Whitman, 40 [III] P.D. at 349, (where the Supreme Court of
Israel confirms the Kotelidsky holding but warns that the inclusion of diagrams, maps,
charts and plants, all of which lack any written text, as "literary works" is an "anomaly"
which should not be extended beyond what the definition requires).
32. Kotelidsky, 1982 [A] P.M. at 393. See also Henry, Legal Protection of Printed Circuit Boards and Semiconductor Chips underAustralia's Copyright and Design Act, 2 Int'l
Computer Law Advisor 14 (Oct. 1987) (Analysing a similar provision in Australia's British-Based Copyright Law.

33. Apple, 1987 [A] P.M. at 400.
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sky. 34 In any event, finding that the printed circuit board constituted a
design within the meaning of the statute was apparently not the primary basis for the decision to deny copyright protection to the Mother
36
Board. 35 This author submits that in light of other recent decisions
the reasoning of the Kotelidsky case remains a better statement of the
law.
C.

FOREIGN WORKS

Where Israel is party to a convention relating to copyright protection, the Minister of Justice may issue an order extending copyright
protection to foreign works as required by the terms of the convention.3 7 A protection order shall grant the same protection to works created by foreign nations or published in foreign countries as would be
granted to such works had they been created by Israeli nationals or
published in Israel. In an unusual provision, the 1924 Ordinance states
explicitly that wider protection can be granted to such works if the convention contains an agreement to that effect. 38
To date the Minister of Justice has exercised the power to grant
such orders on four occasions. 39 For example, Copyright Order (United
34. Id at 407.
35. The Apple court placed great emphasis on the fact that the evidence did not show
that the printed circuit had been registered or published in the United States, or that it
had been created by a U.S. resident. 1987 [A] P.M. at 407. Thus, the provisions of the
Copyright Order applicable to the United States did not confer Israeli protection on the
"foreign" circuit boards. Copyright Order (United States) 5713-1953, 1953 K.T. 1117.
Given the record before it, this conclusion appears correct, although strictly speaking, the
matter of registration of a foreign work is irrelevant. 1987 [A] P.M. at 397. See infra text
accompanying notes 38-46.
The Apple court also stated that the printed circuit did not fit neatly into any of the
regular categories in the definition of "literary work" contained in section 35(a) of the
1911 Act, a conclusion that contradicts of the decisions previously cited. See, supra note
18. The Apple court also speculated that the printed circuit may be a candidate for patent
protection. This conclusion regarding printed circuits is of dubious persuasiveness.
36. In Strosky v. Whitman, the Supreme Court of Israel rejected a claim that an advertising sign was a "design," and that as a result the design was excluded from copyright
protection. 40[III] P.D. at 355-356. The sign (like a printed circuit) has no use independent of the printing on it, and thus the printing is not a design but an integral part of the
object.
37. Copyright Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 5713-1953, § 6, 7 L.P. 30 (amending the
1924 Copyright Ordinance, 1 L.P. 389).
38. Id39. The four orders include: Copyright Order 5713-1953, 1953 K.T. 818 (referring to
the convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berne, September 9,
1886, revised Berlin, 1908, Rome, 1928, Brussels, 1948, Stockholm, 1967, Paris, 1971 (hereinafter "the Berne Convention")]; Copyright Order 5713-1953, 1953 K.T. 1117 (referring to
an Exchange of Notes between the Government of Israel and the Government of the
United States of America Constituting an Agreement on Copyright, May 4, 1950 (herein-
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States) 5713-1953 provides that a work first published in the United
States will be protected as if it were first published in Israel; an unpublished work created by a United States citizen will be protected as if it
were created by an Israeli citizen. 4° Other orders provide similar protection to works that are published in countries which are members of
the Berne Copyright Union 41 , or parties to the Universal Copyright
Convention 42 , or works that are created by nationals of such countries.
It should be noted that to be protected in Israel works need not be
registered in the United States or in other copyright convention countries. A work qualifies for protection if it is first published in a country
which is party to a copyright convention. Thus, although at least one
Israeli court made issue of the fact that there was no evidence that particular work had been registered in the United States, 43 the proper
grounds for refusing protection of the work is the absence of proof that
the work had been first published in the United States, or that the
work had been created by a United States national. Israel, like most
European countries, has no registration requirement, and the copyright
laws protect authors without requiring them to register their works
with Israeli authorities.
The Orders issued pursuant to the Berne and Universal Copyright
Conventions and pertaining to the United States may be of particular
significance because of the power given to the Minister of Justice by the
1924 Ordinance. If the relevant convention so provides, the Minister
may grant foreign works wider protection from copyright infringement
than would be allowed for works published in Israel." Thus, if one of
the conventions were to be conclusively interpreted or amended to apply to computer software, or if the U.S. and Israel would agree to provide copyright protection to computer programs, then under the 1924
Ordinance unequivocal protection could be extended to computer programs by means of an order of the Minister of Justice. This solution to
the copyright protection problem avoids the lengthy and complex proafter "the exchange of notes"). Copyright Order 5715-1953, 1955 K.T. 1342 referring to the

Universal Copyright convention, Geneva, September 67, 1952, revised, Paris, 1971 (hereinafter "the Universal Convention")]; Copyright Order 5738-1978, 1978 K.T. 1462 [referring
to the Convention for the Protection of Sound Recordings (hereinafter "the Sound Recordings Convention")].
40. Copyright Order (United States) 5713-1953, §§ 1 & 2, 1933 K.T. 1117 (referring to
Exchange of Notes).
41. Copyright Order 5713-1953, §§ 2 & 3, 1953 K.T. 818 (referring to the Berne
Convention).
42. Copyright Order 5715-1955, §§ 2 & 3, 1955 K.T. 1342 (referring to the Universal
Convention, art. 1-3).
43. Apple v. New-Corn, 1987 [A] P.M. at 407.
44. Copyright Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 5713-1953, § 6, 7 L.P. 30.
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cess of amending the 1911 Act or 1924 Ordinance. 45 The difficulty with
this approach is that apparently it would provide added protection for
foreign works only. Indigenous Israel works would continue to be vulnerable to infringement. 46 Therefore, full protection for computer
software will require legislation by the Knesset.
III.

SCOPE OF PROTECTION

The 1911 Act defines "copyright" to mean the "sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form whatsoever ... .1,47 The term copyright also includes the
sole right to do, or authorize someone else to do, any of the following
acts: "to produce, reproduce, perform or publish any translation of the
work . . ." or, (i)n the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, to

make any record, perforated roll, cinematograph file, or other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or
delivered. '48 Performing any of these acts without consent of the
owner constitutes copyright infringement. Anyone who knowingly imports, sells, offers for sale, displays or distributes a work which has
copyright protection also commits an infringement. 49 An infringing
50
copy need not be exact; any "colourable imitation" will suffice.
The application of section 1(2) of the 1911 Act to computer software
appears to support the following propositions: (1) unauthorized reproduction of software "in any material form whatsoever," such as in
source code, on disk, or in ROM, is an infringement; (2) unauthorized
translations of program code, such as translations from one language to
another, create infringing copies of the original programs; and (3) unau45. See, e.g., Copyright Order 5713-1953, § 2, 1978 K.T. 1462 (referring to the Sound
Recordings Convention) (extending the protection of section 19 of the 1911 Act to a broad
category of works called "sound recordings," thus circumventing any questions regarding
the applicability of the 1911 Act to any new technologies in the field of sound
reproduction.)
46. In discussing Copyright Order 5713-1953 (referring to the Berne Convention), the
Supreme Court has remarked that the Order "does not add any additional protection to
Israeli works on the basis of the [Berne] Convention." Etinger v. Almagor, Civ. Appeal
No. 528/73, 28[II] P.D. 116, 118 (1975).
47. 1911 Act § 1(2) (emphasis supplied).
48. Id, § 1(2)(a), (d) (emphasis supplied).
49. Id, § 2(1), (2). For example, in a recent unpublished case, the U.S. producer of
certain software, together with its "exclusive" Israeli distributors, sought a preliminary
injunction against another Israeli company that was importing into Israel and selling copies of the software that it had legally purchased in the United States. Autodesk, Inc. v.
Largo Computers, Ltd., Civil File No. 3226/86, Motion No. 13205/86 (Tel Aviv Dist. Ct. unpublished). The court denied the injunction on the grounds that there was no evidence
that the copies that had been imported, all of which had been produced and sold by the
United States software house, were works that violated section 2(2) of the 1911 Act.
50. 1911 Act, § 35(a).
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thorized copying by a "contrivance" which allows the work to be reproduced on to a fixed medium such as a diskette or ROM chip, is
unlawful.5 1 These propositions find support in Israeli case law, and certain regarding the dichotomy between idea and expression, the substantial and material requirement, copying by contrivance, and prohibited
uses of copyrighted works.
A.

THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN IDEA AND EXPRESSION

Israeli courts, like their brethren overseas, recognize the fundamental proposition that copyright protects the expression of an idea, but
not the idea itself. 52 Copyright protects against the copying or reproduction of a particular work, but it does not confer a monopoly on the
idea behind the work. Copyright law does not protect against the independent creation of a similar work, even if that work is based on the
53
same underlying idea.
The dichotomy between expression and idea plays an important
role in computer software copyright litigation outside of Israel. Infringing defendants often claim that expression and idea in computer programs are inextricably intertwined. With only a limited number of
ways to write a program to accomplish a specific task, defendants claim
that the extension of copyright protection to a particular program,
while presumably intended to protect the specific expression contained
in the program, will have the effect of restricting access to the idea underlying the program. 54 Such a result is both inappropriate and undesirable. Copyright did not develop to protect ideas, processes or
methods, therefore, restricting access to these would be inappropriate.
The result also is undesirable because copyright could be misused to stifle creativity and innovation in the software industry.
The court's response to these claims has been to analyze the particular circumstance in each case in order to determine whether what has
been copied is an idea or the expression of that idea. The Court of Ap51. 1911 Act, § 1(2)(a), (d).
52. Almagor v. Godek, Civ. Appeal No. 559/69, 24 [I] P.D. 825, 829 (1970); Goldenberg
v. Bennet, Civ. App. No. 15/81, 36 [II] P.D. 813, 817 (1981). See Donoghue v. Allied Newspapers, Ltd. [1937] All E.R. 503, [1938] 1 Ch. 106, 110 (stating that the English courts recognize a similar dichotomy). See also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (where the court
discussed the long standing recognition of the dichotomy in the United States).
53. Ladbroke Ltd. v. William Hill Ltd. [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273, 291, [1964] 1 All E.R. 465.
See generally, Nibblett Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Oyez, 1980), at 41-42. To
the extent an idea can be protected, it is protected by patent law. A discussion of application of patent law to computer programs is beyond the scope of this article.
54. See, e.g., Apple 714 F.2d at 1252-54; Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234-40 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 U.S. 877 (1987);
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1181-1233 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
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peals for the Third Circuit in the United States developed the following
test:
We... focus on whether the idea is capable of various modes of expression. If other programs can be written or created which perform the
same function as an Apple's operating system program, then that program is an expression of the idea and hence copyrightable. In essence,
this inquiry is no different than that made to determine whether the
expression and idea have merged, which has been stated to occur
55
where there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular idea.
Copyright will not protect a program if that program is the only reasonable way of accomplishing a particular task.
Although Israeli courts have not directly confronted the issue of
whether the expression in a computer program has merged with its underlying idea, they faced a similar challenge in a different context. The
appellant in Almagor v. Godek was a lyricist engaged to write the words
to a number of songs in the hit Israeli musical Casablan.56 After a dispute with one of the producers, the appellant withdrew from the production. The producer then employed other lyricists to change and
complete some of the songs originally worked on by the appellant. The
appellant alleged that those songs, and a final scene from the musical,
infringed on his copyright. In their defense, the appellees argued that
because they needed to compose songs which would serve a predetermined dramatic purpose in the plot, and conform to a predetermined
melody and tempo, they had only a limited number of alternative
modes of expression from which to choose. They argued that the protection of the appellant's songs would amount to protecting the idea behind the songs, and not the particular expression embodied in the song.
Although the lower court accepted this argument, the Israeli
Supreme Court took a cautious approach to the problem. A limited
availability of "vocabulary in a language may explain the use of a few
identical words, but the importance of this factor is greater in the context of technical subjects than in the context of song or fiction."57 The
court proceeded to analyze each song for external restraints and available expressions. It found that some songs infringed on the appellant's
copyright while others did not. As in cases involving infringement of
computer programs, the court must disentangle idea from expression on
a case-by-case factual basis. The Israeli courts would most likely adopt
the Almagor approach where an alleged computer software infringment
claims he was copying an idea, and not an expression.
55. 714 F.2d at 1253.
56. Almagor v. Godek, 24[1] P.D. at 827.
57. Id. at 831.
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B.

THE SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL REQUIREMENT

Israeli courts have adopted the requirement that to constitute infringement a copy must be "substantial and material."s Determining
whether copying is substantial and material necessitates a factual
inquiry:
The question of whether the similarity between two works suffices to
hold that the defendant copied a substantial and material portion of the
protected work is a question of fact and degree, and the answer to this
question must be given not on the basis of a mechanical comparison of
a number of similar words or lines in the works under discussion, but
on the basis of the impression of the judge of the entirety of the
59
works.
In Goldenberg v. Bennet, the holders of rights in the musical Cho-

rus Line sued the Israeli producers of an allegedly infringing play. The
plaintiffs made no claim that the lyrics or music had been directly
translated or copied; instead, they claimed that taken as a whole the Israeli production constituted an infringing copy of Chorus Line. After

comparing the two musicals, the Israeli Supreme Court found for the

plaintiffs:
The comparison of the two musicals . . . indicates . . . that all of the
dramatic combinations and counterpoints of the incidents constituting
the tangible expression in Chorus Line that were new, special or original.... were copied with only slight camouflage in the Israeli musical.
We are speaking of an imitation of the entirety of the situation and incidents with changes and modifications that were insufficient to hide
60
the true source.
The court, pointing to similarities in plot, scenes, music, scenery and
staging, found a breach of copyright despite the absence of any word-byword or line-by-line similarities between the two musicals.

One might interpret the Goldenberg holding as an Israeli version of
the look and feel doctrine which has emerged from a number of recent

U.S. cases finding that computer programs reproducing the look and
feel of a protected program had infringed the copyright held by the
owners of the original. In Whelan v. Jaslow, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit held that "copyright protection of computer programs may extend beyond programs' literal code to their
structure, sequence, and organization." 6 1 In Broderbund v. Unison, the
58. Goldenberg, 36 [III] P.D. at 823; Almagor, 24 [I] P.D. See Chatterton v. Cave
[1878] 3 App. Cas. 483, 497-98; 47 L.J.Q.B. 545 (containing an early English statement of
the requirement for "substantial and material" copying).
59. Goldenberg, 36[III] P.D. at 823.
60. Id at 822.
61. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1248. It is not surprising that the Whelan court relied on
analogies to cases involving alleged infringement of book and movie plots.
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district court extended copyright protection to the "structure, sequence
and arrangement of... text, artwork, and user inputs. '62 In both cases,
the infringer had at one point been in a confidential relationship with
the creator of the original program, either as an employee or licensee,
and had exploited the knowledge and information gained to create a
similar, though not identical, program.
Recent attempts to extend the look and feel doctrine to cases
where there was no confidential relationship between the infringer and
the owner of the original program have made the software industry nervous. 63 In early 1987, the American software giant Lotus Development

brought suit against two relatively small software houses, Paperback
Software and Mosaic Software, alleging infringement of its popular "Lotus 1-2-3" spreadsheet program. Smaller companies fear that software
giants will use the threat of "look and feel" litigation to attack their
competitors, thus reducing the vitality and competitiveness of the industry.64 The industry worries that such litigation would "stifle innovation,
and discourage the spread of standards that would help computer users
'6 5
master software made by different companies.
To date Israeli courts have not been required to rule on an alleged
copyright infringement of the look and feel of a computer program. So
far the cases decided have involved admitted copying of virtually all of a
program. 66 It is therefore premature to conclude that the Goldenberg
holding represents the adoption of a look and feel approach by the Israeli courts. Consequently, it is not clear whether the courts will protect the organization, sequence and structure of a program. A limited
look and feel approach, requiring manifest similarity in organization, sequence, and structure of programs, would constitute a logical and constructive extension of the substantial and material doctrine into the
realm of computer programs.
C.

COPYING BY CONTRIVANCE

Israeli courts have applied the 1911 Act to new technological methods of copying. In Israel v. Videotext, the defendant claimed that an
electromagnetic copy of a video cassette produced by means of a video
recorder was not an infringing copy under the 1911 Act.67 The court
62. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1127.
63. See Bunnell, Feel and Loathing in Phoenix-'Look and Feel' Stirs Debate at PC
Forum, 6 SUBROUTINES (March 1987).
64. Id.
65. Wessel, Software Display's Copyright Upheld" Judge Bans Sale of Similar Pro-

duce, Wall. St.J., Apr. 2, 1987, at 32, col. 3.
66. Apple v. New-Corn, 1987 [A] P.M. at 406 (where defendants copied all but 80 of the
16,000 lines in Apple's software, a "substantial and material" copying by any standard).
67. Israel v. Videotext, 1983 [B] P.M. at 60.

COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

1987)

found that electromagnetic copying constituted both copying by means
of any "other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered" and reproducing "in any material form
whatsoever". a The court rejected claims that "electromagnetic" copying is not "mechanical" copying, and that the 1911 Act should be limited
to forms of copying known to the legislator at the time the law was
originally enacted. The court's noted:
[a] good law anticipates the future. Thus, when it uses general technical concepts such as "other contrivance" or "mechanically" the court is
authorized to attempt to interpret these general concepts and to harmonize them with the needs of the hour and technological progress-69
provided the application is not "forced" or an exercise in "acrobatics."
The court found that the use of the term "other contrivance" clearly
"leaves a wide opening that enables (the 1911 Act) to apply to every future device or contrivance, even to those not known to the legislator
'70
and even to those that could not be predicted in advance.
The same reasoning should be applied by Israeli courts when called
upon to decide what constitutes a copy or an infringing use of a computer program. If they follow the logic of Videotext, the courts will conclude that the reverse engineering of a ROM chip, or the storing of
object code, or other new technological modes of copying, constitute
copying by means of "contrivance." This logical extension of Videotext,
however, is not certain. The courts may focus on Section 1(2)d of the
1911 Act which requires the contrivance to "perform" or "deliver" the
work. A new technology of copying, while enabling the operation and
use of a computer program, arguably may not enable the "performance"
or "delivery" of the program. Therefore, another possible interpretation of the 1911 Act is that it does not protect against copying by means
of an unauthorized "contrivance" of this type. To prevent this uncertainty, new legislation should specify the types of copying and other
uses of computer programs that will require authorization of the copyright owner.
D.

PERMITTED USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

The 1911 Act specifically permits several uses of copyrighted works
which would constitute copyright infringements. Drawn from modern
needs, permitted uses include any "fair dealing with any work for the
purposes of private summary, research, criticism, review or newspaper
summary." Permitted uses also include, in certain circumstances, the
68. 1911 Act, § 1(2).
69. 1983 [B] P.M. at 60.
70. Id. at 61.
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making of records and other mechanical reproductions of sound. 71
Efficient private use of computer programs requires that the user
made a back-up copy of all computer programs in case the original is
somehow corrupted or destroyed. In the absence of special provisions to
the contrary, the unauthorized creation of a back-up copy obviously involves the production of an infringing copy of the program. By enacting
legislation which specifically permits the making of copies for the "utilization of the computer program" or for "archival purposes only," the
United States resolved this infringement problem. 72 The legitimate
owner of a computer program is entitled to make a back-up copy to be
used in case the original copy is lost, destroyed, or rendered unusable.73
Israel needs similar legislation. Reading a new exception into the
1911 Act in order to permit direct copying of software in certain circumstances goes beyond the traditional interpretative powers of the court.
Such a reading is too broad even for a court like the Vidotext court,
willing to "juggle" the words of the 1911 Act. New legislation is the
only answer.
IV.

THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP

The 1911 Act provides that "the author of a work shall be the first
owner of the copyright therein. '7 4 If the author "was in the employment of some other person under a contract of service or apprenticeship," then ownership of the copyright in a work made during the
course of employment shall, in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, vest in "the person by whom the author was employed."7 5
Thus in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the copyright in a
computer program created by a person "under a contract of employment" with a software house, will belong to the software house. The
case of a software house employee poses few problems. Many situations
may arise, however, where the 1911 Act does not provide a satisfactory
answer. Such situations can be dealt with by contractual arrangements
between the parties, but it would be preferable if the law provided more
definite answer in the event the parties failed to anticipate the issue of
copyright ownership.
A typical problem situation involves customized software developed
by a software house according to special order for valuable consideration. Typically the ordering company lists its operation requirements,
71. 1911 Act, §§ 2(1)(i), 19(2).
72. Computer Software Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-517, § ld(b), 94 Stat. at
3028 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1982)).

73. See also Crisp, supra note 7, at 300-301.
74. 1911 Act, § 5(1).
75. Id § 5(1)(b).
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provides basic specifications, and sometimes permits or requires personnel from the software house to work at its facilities or on its computer.
The software house is usually an independent contractor, therefore no
employer-employee relationship exists. Hence, in this case, the copyright would belong to the software house designing the program and
not to the company placing the order. The 1911 Act has a special provision dealing with works made according to order for valuable consideration. This provision gives the copyright to the person placing the order,
'76
but it is limited to the case of an "engraving, photograph, or portrait.
Assuming that computer software is not an "engraving, photograph, or
portrait," software made on order belongs to the developer and not to
77
the company placing the order and paying for development.
A question arises as to copyright ownership when a freelance
programmer is hired by a software house to assist on a large project to
develop software. Once again, an employer-employee relationship may
not exist if the software house has not properly protected its rights by
contract. 78 In that case, the freelance programmer will own the copy79
right in the portions of the project that he designed or developed.
Another question arises as to copyright ownership when a computer writes the software. With the advent of artificial intelligence,
more programs are written by other programs with less direct human
input.80 Short of a forced interpretation, the 1911 Act cannot address
76. Id. § 5(1)(a).
77. See, e.g., Strosky v. Whitman, 40 [III] P.D. 340 (1985) (where the question of who
owned the copyright in advertising signs turned on whether the sign was an "engraving"
for purposes of section 5(1)(a) of the 1911 Act). The Strosky court concluded that it was
not an engraving, and therefore ownership of the copyright remained with the graphic
artists who produced the signs, and not with the ice cream manufacturer who ordered and
paid for them. 40 [III] P.D. at 350-355.
78. The question of the existence of an employer-employee relationships troublesome
and uncertain. No single universal definition of these terms exists. In fact, "a person may
be deemed an employee for purposes of one law, but not deemed an employee for (purposes of) another law." State of Israel v. Nisim, 35 [IV] P.D. 748, 758. Civ. Appeal Nos.
502/78, 515/78, 79/79 (1980). In the field of labor law, the clear trend has been to expand
the variety of relationships that will be deemed "employer-employee" relationships. See,
e.g., Hershlikovitch v. Pazgas Marketing Company, Ltd., Hearing No. 3-82/M.H., 17 P.D.A.
97 (1985) (an "independent" agent can be considered an "employee"). It is difficult to predict how the courts would approach this question in the context of computer programmers. Cf, BPI Systems, Inc. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D. Tex. 1981) (work
specially ordered and commissioned is not "work made for hire" where the programmer is
not a regular employee).
79. Filmtechnique (Israel) Ltd. v. Tax Assessor, Tel Aviv 5, Civ. Appeal No. 691/66,
21[II] P.D. 642, 645 (1967), (where the Supreme Court found that the translatorwas the
first owner of the copyright in films translated to order, but that upon receipt of payment,
the translator transferred the copyright to Filmtechnique).
80. Butler, Can a Computer Be an Author? Copyright Aspects of Artificial Intelligence, 16 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L. REv. 385 (1984).
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the issue of computer-written software. The issue of copyright owner8
ship in computer software is thus ripe for legislation.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO ISRAELI LAW
Drawing on the experiences in Israel and abroad, Israel's copyright
law should be amended:
Section 35(1) of the 1911 Act should include a definition of com82
puter program.
(b) The definition of "literary work" in section 35(a) of the 1911 Act
should include computer programs regardless of the medium
(source code object code, ROM chip, firmware or microcode) in
which they are fixed.83
(c) Section 1(2) of the 1911 Act, which lists the exclusive rights conferred upon copyright owners, should state that the computer program copyright owner has the sole right to store the work in a
computer and to make any translations or adaptations of the work
it into or out of another computer lanby means of converting
84
guage or code.
(d) Section 2(1) of the 1911 Act, which lists acts not considered as infringements, should permit the lawful possessor of a computer
program to use it in a computer and to make copies for archival
85
purposes.
(e) Section 5 of the 1911 Act, which deals with copyright ownership,
should provide that copyright ownership in a computer-generated
work belongs to the person who undertook the arrangements nec(a)

81. See generally Sorrel, The Treatment of Computer Software Works Made for Hire
under the Copyright Law of 1976, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 579. The author suggests that courts
should consider the following factors when determining who owns the copyright in a
work arguably made for hire: (i) the responsibility for creating the work; (ii) the existence and terms of the relevant employment contract; (iii) the scope of employment;
(iv) the employer's right to supervise and control the work; and (v) the employer's payment of expenses and/or wages. See Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793
F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1986).
82. The various amendments and proposals considered by panels and legislatures
throughout the world contain a number of definitions of computer programs. A relatively
simple, but accurate definition appears a bill submitted to the U.S. Congress by Rep. Kastenmeier: "(a) 'computer program' means a set of instructions capable, when incorporated
in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having information processing capabilities to indicate, perform or achieve a particular function, task or result." H.R. 6983,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1982).
83. This proposed amendment codifies the Apple, holding. It also reflects the international consensus. See notes 14-25 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act, 1985, ch. 41, §§ 1(2), 2
(forming the basis of the article's suggested agreement).
85. This proposed amendment relies on the Copyright Software Amendment Act of
1980. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See Graft, CombattingSoftware Piracy: A Statutory Proposal to Strengthen Software Copyright, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1029 (1985) (providing a
more detailed description of non-infringing uses).
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essary to create the computer output or computer-generated
work 86 and should specify criteria for determining who owns a
work
created pursuant to an independent
contractor
87
relationship.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The 1911 Act, with the assistance of creative judges, has proved remarkably adaptable to inevitable, but unanticipated, technological progress. To ask, however, that the 1911 Act cope with the copyright
problems posed by computer software without amendment is too ask
too much even from a well-drafted law. The need to afford copyright
protection to computer programs raises issues which deserve the Knesset's immediate attention.

86. See British Computer Society, Intellectual Propertyand Innovation, 5 SOFTWARE
PROTECTION 13, 16 (Nov. 1986). This proposed amendment relies on the proposals made
by the British Computer Society.
87. See Sorrel, supra note 81.

